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Abstract
We develop a decision framework with imperfect information to analyze the effects
of transaction costs on the tendency for individuals to remain with a default option.
We demonstrate how transaction costs can be a more important source of such default
effects than commonly thought. A further, potentially surprising result shows that
transaction costs are able to explain why some forms of default effects increase with
the number of options.
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1 Introduction
Individuals often exhibit a disproportionate tendency to remain with a default option, even
when there are potentially better alternatives. Evidence for this important policy issue comes
from many contexts, including contract choice, car options, organ donation, and especially
retirement plans, where savings choices are strongly aligned to the default participation
status and contribution rate (see the review by DellaVigna 2009).
One explanation of such default effects concerns decision inertia.1 This can result from
transaction costs and be further enhanced by procrastination via behavioral self-control
problems (see Madrian and Shea 2001). The current literature focuses on the behavioral
mechanism (e.g. Choi et al 2003, Carroll et al 2009) because direct transaction costs (switch-
ing costs) appear insufficient, due to the relatively low effort often required to administer
a change from the default (e.g. DellaVigna 2009, p.323). However, while procrastination is
undoubtedly important, both this reasoning and the resulting models overlook the indirect
transaction costs (information costs) of identifying and learning about alternatives. This
omission may be significant because such costs can be considerable, especially when the
alternatives are complex, as in the case of retirement plans.
In contrast, this paper explicitly analyzes the role of both direct and indirect transaction
costs by developing a search-theoretic model of individual choice with imperfect information
about the benefits of each alternative.2 It builds on Wilson (2012) who characterizes optimal
consumer behavior under both forms of transaction costs and examines their impact on
oligopoly competition. By extending his analysis within our different setting, we re-examine
the importance of transaction costs in two ways. First, we consider how the inclusion of
indirect transaction costs affects the ability of transaction costs to explain the existence of
default effects. Second, we explore the extent to which transaction costs can account for the
empirical evidence which suggests that default effects increase with the number of options
(e.g. Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988).
1Other explanations, such as those within the reference dependent preferences literature (Munro and Sug-
den, 2003; DellaVigna, 2009) are often framed in terms of a related concept, the status quo bias (Samuelson
and Zeckhauser 1988). Although our model focuses on default effects, it also applies to the status quo bias.
2Search-theoretic models have been used to explore related phenomena such as choice overload (e.g.
Kuksov and Villas-Boas 2010) but not default effects.
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2 Model
An individual must select either a default option, d, or one of (n− 1) alternatives, where n
is an integer greater than one. The benefit of any option j = {d, 1, . . . , n−1} derives from a
‘match value’, εj , which is drawn independently from a uniform distribution on [0, 1]. This
avoids any systematic preference-based sources of default effects. As consistent with the case
where the default is common or where information about the default is readily available,
we assume that the individual is sufficiently familiar with the default that she knows its
match value, εd. However, to introduce imperfect information, we allow the individual to
be initially uninformed about the alternatives.
If the individual takes no action, she automatically receives the default. If she wishes to
select some alternative, j 6= d, she must first incur an information cost, c > 0, to identify
the alternative and learn its match value, εj . The individual can investigate any number of
alternatives sequentially, incurring c each time. After each investigation, she can choose to
either remain with the default at no extra cost or switch to an identified alternative for an
additional switching cost, s > 0.3
The model is deliberately simple, but our main results can hold under more general
assumptions. For instance, if it was unnecessary to incur c to identify an alternative so
that the individual could change to an alternative without knowing its match value, then it
would still be optimal to make a prior investigation provided c was sufficiently small.4
3 Analysis
Let x̂ be the value of x that solves c =
∫ 1
x
(ε− x)dε, such that
x̂ = 1−
√
2c. (1)
Lemma 1. The individual’s optimal decision rule is then:
Step 1: Accept the default immediately if εd ≥ x̂− s. Otherwise move to Step 2.
Step 2: Investigate alternatives until the discovery of some εj ≥ x̂ for j 6= d, or until no
alternative remains.
3Alternatively, s can be interpreted as a recommendation effect, whereby the individual falsely believes
that the default is endorsed in some way.
4Using later notation, this requires x̂ ≥ 0.5 (c ≤ 1/8) so that the benefits of investigating, which can be
considered equal to x̂− s, are larger than those from making an uninformed change, E(ε)− s.
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Step 3: Select the best option from the default and the set of identified alternatives, I,
which offers max{εd, εj − s} ∀ j ∈ I.
This follows straightforwardly from Lemma 1 of Wilson (2012). In Step 1, the individual
decides whether to start investigating the alternatives. Using standard induction arguments,
this reduces to a seemingly-myopic comparison between the benefits of accepting the default
immediately, εd, and the expected net gains from investigating one alternative. To calculate
the latter, note that the individual would only prefer the alternative to the default if its
match value, ε, was greater than εd + s. Thus, the expected net gains are
−c+
∫ εd+s
0
εddε+
∫ 1
εd+s
(ε− s)dε. (2)
Equating this to εd and letting εd+ s ≡ x implies that the individual is indifferent when
c =
∫ 1
x
(ε − x)dε. This provides the implicit definition for x̂ used in (1). Consequently, she
will not investigate if x ≥ x̂ or equivalently, εd ≥ x̂− s. Since c > 0 ensures x̂ < 1, we know
x̂− s < 1, given s > 0.
In Step 2, the individual decides whether to continue investigating alternatives after
having made one (or more) previous investigation(s). Using similar logic, this reduces to a
comparison between the benefits from stopping immediately and the expected net benefits
from investigating one further alternative. It follows that the individual will optimally stop
only on the discovery of an alternative with a sufficiently large match value, ε ≥ x̂. By
construction, the benefits from this alternative, ε− s, will necessarily exceed the benefits of
the default, εd. In Step 3, the individual then selects her best available option.
4 Measures of Default Effects
One common measure of default effects is the probability that the default is selected, Pr(d).
Here,
Pr(d) =
∫ 1
max{x̂−s,0}
dε+
∫ max{0,x̂−s}
0
(ε+ s)n−1dε. (3)
The first term is the probability that the individual accepts the default immediately
without any investigations, Pr(εd ≥ x̂ − s). The second term is the probability that the
individual selects the default after having made at least one investigation. From Lemma 1,
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this only occurs if she investigates all (n− 1) alternatives yet still prefers the default. This
requires i) εd < x̂− s from Step 1, ii) εj < x̂ ∀j 6= d from Step 2 and iii) εd ≥ εj − s ∀j 6= d
from Step 3. As i) and iii) are sufficient to ensure that ii) is satisfied, Step 2 plays no direct
role in determining Pr(d). Finally, if x̂ − s ≤ 0, then the individual never investigates, so
Pr(d) = 1.
After simplifying (3),
Pr(d) =


1− (x̂− s) +
(
x̂n−sn
n
)
∈ ( 1
n
, 1
)
if x̂− s > 0
1 if x̂− s ≤ 0.
(4)
However, as a measure, Pr(d) does not incorporate the fact that the default could be
optimal even if c and s were zero, because it could offer the highest match value, εd > εj
∀j 6= d. This occurs with probability,
Pr(d|c = s = 0) =
∫ 1
0
εn−1dε = (1/n) > 0. (5)
Consequently, by building on the seminal paper by Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988),
who account for this issue empirically by comparing the number of subjects who selected an
exogenous default with the number who selected the same option when it was not framed as
a default, we consider two other measures. The ‘absolute default effect’, DA, is the difference
in probability between selecting the default and the default offering the highest match value;
and the ‘relative default effect’, DR, is this difference as a proportion.
DA = Pr(d)− Pr(d|c = s = 0) and DR = Pr(d)− Pr(d|c = s = 0)
Pr(d|c = s = 0) (6)
From (5) and (6),
DA = Pr(d)− (1/n) and DR = nPr(d)− 1. (7)
As an example, suppose n = 10 such that Pr(d|c = s = 0) = 0.1. If c = s = 0.01, so that
c and s each account for 1% of the maximum possible gains from selecting an alternative,
then Pr(d) = 0.17, DA = 0.07 and DR = 0.73. Thus, the default is selected over 70% more
often than it would if c = s = 0.
5
5 Results
This section analyzes how the three measures vary first with respect to c and s, and then n.
We assume x̂− s > 0 so that Pr(d) < 1. When Pr(d) = 1, the measures are independent of
c and s, and our results with regard to n remain qualitatively robust.
5.1 Transaction Costs
Proposition 1. Pr(d), DA and DR are increasing in c and s.
Proof: From (7), we need only prove that ∂Pr(d)/∂z > 0 for z = c, s. From (4),
∂Pr(d)/∂c ≡ (∂Pr(d)/∂x̂) · (∂x̂/∂c) = (1− x̂n−1)/(1− x̂) and ∂Pr(d)/∂s = 1−sn−1. These
are positive given n ≥ 2 and 0 < s < x̂ < 1.
An increase in c raises the three measures by lowering the incentives to begin an in-
vestigation in Step 1. An increase in s produces a related effect but it also reduces the
attractiveness of switching to an identified alternative in Step 3. However, information costs
are a relatively more powerful determinant of default effects in the following sense.
Proposition 2. The partial derivatives of Pr(d), DA and DR, with respect to c are larger
than the corresponding partial derivatives with respect to s.
Proof: From (7), we need only prove that (∂Pr(d)/∂c)− (∂Pr(d)/∂s) = (1− x̂n−1)/(1−
x̂)− (1− sn−1) > 0. This follows given n ≥ 2 and 0 < s < x̂ < 1.
The difference can be substantial; under our example parameters from Section 4, ∂Pr(d)/∂c
is over five times larger than ∂Pr(d)/∂s. This suggests that the omission of information
costs from arguments and models within the existing literature is indeed significant and that
transaction costs may be more important than commonly thought. Intuitively, the result
is not due to the fact that information costs can be incurred multiple times because it still
holds when there is only one alternative. Instead, relative to a unit increase in s, a unit
increase in c generates a sufficiently greater effect in reducing the expected net gains from
making a first investigation. This follows from (2), where the individual expects to incur
c with certainty but expects to incur s only if the identified alternative is preferred to the
default, which occurs with a probability less than one.
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5.2 Number of Options
Proposition 3. Pr(d) is decreasing in n, but DA and DR are increasing in n.
Proof: Given n ≥ 2 and 0 < s < x̂ < 1: i) ∆Pr(d) ≡ Pr(d|n+1)−Pr(d|n) = − ∫ x̂−s
0
(ε+
s)n−1(1− (ε+s))dε < 0, and ii) ∆DA ≡ DA(n+1)−DA(n) = 1−n[x̂
n(1−x̂)−sn(1−s)]−(x̂n−sn)
n(n+1)
and ∆DR ≡DR(n + 1) − DR(n) = 1 − (x̂ − s) − [xn(1 − x̂) − sn(1 − s)] are both positive
because they are decreasing in x̂, yet still positive as x̂→ 1.
Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) find empirical evidence that all three measures increase
with n. Transaction costs cannot easily explain why Pr(d) rises with n. However, perhaps
surprisingly, Proposition 3 shows that they are able to explain the evidence for DA and DR.
Intuitively, an increase in n leaves the decision to start investigating in Step 1 unchanged,
yet increases the probability of finding a preferred alternative in Step 2, such that Pr(d)
falls. However, as well as reducing Pr(d), an increase in n also lowers the probability
that the default offers the highest match value, Pr(d|c = s = 0) = (1/n). Given DA =
Pr(d) − Pr(d|c = s = 0) and DR = (Pr(d)/Pr(d|c = s = 0)) − 1, the reduction in
Pr(d|c = s = 0) is always sufficiently large relative to the reduction in Pr(d) such that both
DA and DR increase.
6 Discussion
Transaction costs may be a more important source of default effects than commonly thought.
However, as transaction costs cannot explain all of the evidence, future research might
further consider the interaction between both direct and indirect transaction costs and other
explanations. In particular, our search-theoretic framework could offer additional insights
when combined with a behavioral model of procrastination, such as Choi et al (2003) or
Carroll et al (2009). In contrast to current models that assume full information, this would
allow an analysis of the interaction between transaction costs and procrastination under
imperfect information, and offer the potential for more general policy advice.
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